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ABSTRACT
With the emergence of regional economic blocs, the focus
has shifted to recent economic development in the Latin
American region. This thesis addresses the question of
Japan's economic influence in the region and the implications
for Latin America's economic future. It is argued that
Japan's strategy in the region is based upon economic needs
and the importance of securing a position in the regional
economic development and potential Americas trading bloc. It
is proven by using an analysis of economic relationships and
trade patterns used by Japan in Asia compared to current
Japanese economic activities in Latin America. Major findings
include Japan's strategy is situational on targeted countries
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the end of the Cold War global international
economic relationships have become even more important.
Economically, Japan has been viewed as an aggressive adversary-
vice a competent competitor. Due to the long historic
economic relationship of the United States and Latin America
there has been concern over Japan's aggressive economic
practices in the Latin American region.
In one form or another Free Trade Areas have been in
existence since World War II. With the past failures of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to resolve trade
issues, regional economic trading blocs have emerged as the
wave of the future. Although Japan's economic involvement in
Latin America dates back to pre- World War II, it is the
current economic strategies that are of interest. This thesis
is intended to determine what Japan's strategy is for the
Latin American region and what influence it has on the
economic development of the region.
The three competing hypothesis presented suggest that
Japan's interest in Latin America is driven by different
factors including the large immigration of Japanese to the
region after World War II, the basic needs for raw materials
and the need to play an economic role in any developing
economic bloc. In the pivotal section of this thesis the
vi
economic relationships and trade patterns of Japan's
activities in Latin America are compared to those instituted
by Japan in Southeast Asia. I argue that Japan does have a
strategy for targeted Latin American countries that is
situational for the economic needs of Japan; additionally,
economic activities are approached on a case by case basis.
Each country is approached with an astute economic policy
nuanced by the economic goals and needs of Japan i.e., the
need of raw materials and/or solidifying substantial trade
positions in a potential Western Hemisphere trading bloc.
In conclusion, the implications of both the emergence of
trading blocs and the new-found mission of Japan in Latin
America opens up endless possibilities of trade patterns in
the Pacific Rim. With the recent advances with GATT and the
regional trade agreements resulting in more free trade
opportunities, the Latin American region can only benefit with
economic growth and development that will contribute to a




A. THE NEW REALITIES
Since the end of the Cold War more attention has been
given to the emergence of Japan as an economic superpower.
With the highly publicized controversial Japanese trade
practices there has been a growing view in the United States
of Japan as an adversary. This rivalry continues as Japan
secures stronger economic influence in the Latin American
region. With the potential of emerging trading blocs the
Japanese have increased economic activity in the Latin
American region in the past few years.
Recently more attention has been given to the emergence of
these regional economic trading blocs. With the past highly
publicized problems with the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)
, there has been a growing view that economic
regionalism is the wave of the future.
Since the late 1950' s the European Community (EC) has had
significant economic influence as it has evolved into a
powerful economic trading bloc of the 1990' s. The United
States and Canada have had a significant free trade agreement
dating back to the Reciprocity Treaty of 1874 and more
recently with the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement. 1 Since
Canada and Mexico already conduct approximately two- thirds of
their trade with the United States the addition of Mexico and
the establishment of the North American Free Trade Area
(NAFTA) will give legitimate birth to the second major
economic trading bloc. The third free trade area is Southeast
Asia led by the economic dynamics of Japan.
The history of Japanese economic influence in Latin
America dates back to World War II; however, there continues
to be increasing and diversified economic activities in the
region in the past few years. The question is : What is
Japan's economic strategy for Latin America and why?
The purpose of this thesis is to determine what is Japan's
economic strategy for Latin America. In determining what
drives Japan to Latin America, I propose three competing
hypotheses
:
1. Japan's interest in Latin America is based on the post
World War II Japanese immigration to the region.
2. Japan's interest in Latin America stems from the basic
geo- strategic economic needs of commercial gain and raw
material resources.
3. Japan's interest in Latin America is driven by the
economic necessity of being a part of any emerging
economic trading bloc.
'"US and Canada Trade Agreement, " 1987 Congressional Quarterly
Almanac, v. 3, p. 662, 1987
B . METHODOLOGY
Associational analysis is used to link Japanese economic
relationships and patterns to the economic development of the
Latin America region; as well as, to identify those links that
are most likely to influence future economic events in Latin
America. There is a tendency to view Japan's aggressive
economic practices as adversarial behavior vice calculated and
situational competition. This analysis provides an approach
to identify indirect as well as direct links to economic
relationships in previous regions of Japanese economic
development and apply them to various causal chains in Latin
America.
The four major sections of the thesis will be 1) the
evaluation of Japanese influence during the three economic
development phases in Latin America. This section will provide
the basic information to set the stage of Japan's awakening to
the economic and political dynamics in Latin America; 2) the
formation of regional economic blocs and current strategic
economic activities in the region; 3) this section focuses on
Japanese economic activities and strategies used in Southeast
Asia compared to current business practices in the Latin
American region; and 4) country case studies of the economic
dimensions of the Japanese influence. The countries selected
showcase Japanese economic influence in four distinct and
different relationships: Panama as a tax shelter and shipping
haven, Mexico as a cooperative growth oriented economy,
Brazil as a defiant nation groping with financial problems,
and Chile carving out its place in a new world order.
II. MARKET MENTALITY
A. THE JAPANESE PHOENIX 1952-1976
Upon regaining its independence in 1952, Japan rose out of
the ashes emerging as an economic entity. Shortly after World
War II large numbers of immigrants from Japan relocated to
Latin America with over 100,000 settling in Brazil, 80,000 in
Peru and another 30,000 in Argentina. The government of Japan
understood the economic importance of these ethnic enclaves as
well as the limitations of the island. The economic
importance of establishing an import source for raw materials
and food was paramount. Japan looked toward Latin America,
using the Japanese communities in various countries to
facilitate the trading relationships. 2
From the 1960's to mid 1970 's Latin America was in a fast
development mode through import substitution industries,
protective import barriers and debt financed growth. Japan
was attracted to the region not only as a source of raw
materials but also as a source of trade for their own rapidly
developing economy.
Since 1952 the policies of Japan toward Latin America have
been in concert with its most important relationship- the
2 Pope G. Atkins, Latin America in the International Political
System , (Westview Press, 1989) p. 104.
United States. Japan was content with the United States
influence over Latin America which was perceived as a
deterrence to the spread of communism and a global balance of
power. Taking the lead of American investors Japanese trading
companies made major investments in Latin America expecting
tidy profits as the Americans had been receiving. It is a
question of whether supply or demand factors caused the
competitive lending by Japanese banks that began in the 1970 's
and continued until 1982. By 1982, seven countries accounted
for two thirds of all bank loans to the Third World with Latin
America the most important borrowing region. Brazil and
Mexico alone represented 43% of Third World debt while
Argentina, Venezuela and Chile added another 14% 3 The
causes of the lending wave are debatable; however, both sides
had their reasons. On the supply side- the Japanese banks had
high liquidity and perceived profit margins that resulted in
"loan pushing" by the government of Japan. 4 On the demand
side- the Latin American governments borrowed to promote
industrialization developing economic growth to aid their own
legitimacy.
The timing of the Japanese loans caused problems as well.
As illustrated in Table 1 from 1970-1982 the U.S. banks
^Barbara Stallings, "The Reluctant Giant: Japan and the Latin
American Debt Crisis," Journal of Latin American Studies, v. 22,
February 199 0, p. 3.
4Stallings, p. 2.
managed an average of 42% of the Latin American loans, while
Japanese banks were far behind with only 10%. U.S. loans were
consistent while Japanese banks by contrast, operated in
cycles as the oil shocks affected the Japanese economy causing
banks to back off until there were more favorable
conditions. 5 Although the U.S. had twice the share of Latin
American total debt, Japanese exposure was higher at 72% of
total late developing country (LDC) loans. 6 Since Japanese
banks have a lower capital to asset ratio it makes the loans
to Latin America more important in terms of bank
vulnerability. By mid- late 1970 's Japan had substantial
investments in natural resources in Mexico and Brazil.
Japan's imports from Latin America concentrated in minerals,
fuel (oil) and agriculture; whereas, exports to Latin America
were industrial products (that supported the stagnating import
substitution industries) and some consumer goods.
B. THE AWAKENING 197 6-19 82
1976 saw Jimmy Carter elected to the White House. Without
notice and almost immediately upon taking office the Carter
administration changed policy toward Latin America
drastically, including curbing business practices of U.S.
firms in the region. Japan now started to realize that it
5Stallings, p. 5.
6Stallings, p. 7.
TABLE 2-1. LEAD MANAGERS FOR LATIN AMERICAN EUROLOANS
,
1970-82 (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS). FIGURES IN BRACKETS REFER TO
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Source: Barbara Stallings, "The Reluctant Giant: Japan and
The Latin American Debt Crisis, " Journal of Latin American
Studies, Volume 22, February 1990
must start making its own decisions and policies. During the
late 1970 's there was a loss of Latin American economic
momentum caused by the protective import barriers, debt
financed growth, and stagnated industry. With the onset of
the debt problem voluntary lending ceased. Third world debt
had increased from $11 billion in 1970 to $261 billion by 1982
with Brazil and Mexico alone making up 43% of the total. 7
Latin America became less attractive for Japanese investment
and there was a shift of Japanese interest to other areas of
the world (southeast and south Asia) . In 1973 there were
three major U.S. decision policies with international impact
that suddenly made the government of Japan aware of the
strategic importance of the Latin American region: 8
1. The renegotiation of the Panama Canal Treaty caused
Japan great concern because of the dependence on the





The embargo on the export of soybeans from the United
States forced Japan to look for another source which
Brazil was able to provide.
3. The U.S. decision to develop Alaskan oil for domestic
use caused Japan (absolutely certain they would have




8Susan Kaufman Purcell and Robert M. Immerman, "Japan, Latin
America, and the United States: Prospects for Cooperation and
Conflict," Japan and Latin America in the New Global Order ,
(American Society Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 124.
These factors contributed to Japan's emergence with a new
self determination on international policy versus the
unchc _enged support of U.S. policy as in the past. Some of
the strong stances Japan has taken against United States
policy in Latin America include:
• opposed U.S. military intervention in the region
• defied U.S. embargo and became the principal purchaser of
Cuban sugar
• supported pro-Argentine position on Malvinas conflict
By late 1988 Japan had spread her wings in the political arena
of Latin America.
C. THE DEBT CRISIS 19 82-19 88
Some of this new-found Japanese self-determination toward
decision making and policy setting was evident when the
Japanese investors got caught in the debt crisis. There was
immediate criticism of the U.S. investment policies toward
Latin America and the region's debt management. The debt
crisis was partly caused by over borrowing and the
mismanagement of import substitution industries. 9 Mexico, in
1982, was the first to default on loans and was quickly
followed by other counties unable to pay the debt service.
To understand Japan's involvement in the debt crisis
resolution sets the stage to understanding Japan's redefined
9A. Blake Friscia, "Japanese Economic Relations with Latin
America, " Japan and Latin America in the New Global Order . (Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 9.
10
interest in Latin America in the post crisis period. Although
several plans were devised, the Brady Plan (a plan for linking
bank loan increases to economic growth and structural reforms)
was initiated and applied toward Mexico with some positive
results. Although Japan was lured into supplying more money
under the Brady Plan to Latin America in debt resolution
projects, the government of Japan was also developing another
plan to increase its own role in Latin American affairs.
Japan's own initiative, in 1988, known as the "Capital
Recycling Program" would have interesting consequences on U.S.
economic foreign policy and the future development of Latin
America. The stated purpose of this plan was to direct part
of Japan's large trade surplus to Latin America as official
assistance and loans. The Japanese presented the plan as a
way to use its new wealth as strategic assistance to help
solve problems threatening U.S. interests and economic
stability. Japan's Minister of Finance- Tadao Chino states
"foreign investment should contribute to the government's
foreign policy goals and strengthen Japan's economy". 10
Despite rhetoric to the contrary, this statement clearly
signals Japan's objective of enhancing its economy abroad and
also its foreign policy. It could be better understood as an
investment for the future of Japan in Latin America.
10Friscia, p. 63
11
Although Japan had developed the Capital Recycling Plan
as a concept to transfer excess capital to developing
countries with the focus on the benefit to the Japanese
economy, the concept was heralded as one of Japan's few major
international initiatives in the post- World War II era.
The funds would be channeled through various Japanese
organizations designating Japanese investment handlers as the
money managers. Some of agencies controlling the money
movement included:
* Direct loans by the Japanese Export/Import Bank (JEXIM)
* Joint or co-financing schemes with other international
banking systems
* Assistance credited as Japanese foreign aid using such
agencies as the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF)
* Capital Recycling funds as financial contributions to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
Approximately 45% of the monies the Japanese had
designated as Capital Recycling Plan funds were direct
contributions to the IMF. This caused concern to the Japanese
because they lost control of how the monies would be utilized;
whereas, concessional development loans arranged through
Japanese agencies were more lucrative and more of what the
Japanese had in mind.
The types of loans promoted by the Japanese in their
investments were designed to secure a commitment from the
developing country that would promote Japanese economic




Although prior to 1980 Brazil was the third ranking
country for Japanese investments abroad (specifics discussed
in Brazil case study) , by mid- 1980 's the chief foreign direct
investments were still only for tax haven purposes and
shipping (specifics discussed in Panama/Caymen case study)
.
In fact, by 1988 Caribbean investments had increased 800% from
$640 million in 1981 to 5 billion (Table 2)
.
11 The majority
of this was due to the establishment of the Japanese
Export/Import Bank to handle the Capital Recycling Plan funds.
The investment statistics are misleading because it's only
paper investments for Japanese tax purposes instead of actual
manufacturing investments for economic growth in the region.
In fact, the whole setup for the Capital Recycling Plan proved
to be a disappointment to the Latin American region with only
22% being offered to Latin America and over 50% being funneled
to Southeast Asia developing countries. 12 The situation has
changed through the years. As of 1992 the regional commitment
of the Export- Import Bank still favors Asia as indicated in
Table 2-3.














Brazil 510 1.1 349 0.5 615 1.1 6,560 2.1
Mexico 87 0.2 36 0.1 168 0.3 1,874 0.5
Argentina 24 0.1 3 0.0 213 0.4 431 0.1
Venezuela 51 0.1 75 0.1 77 0.1 341 0.1
Chile 46 0.1 47 0.1 30 0.1 311 0.1
Peru 6% 0.2
Subtotal 718 1.5 510 0.8 1.103 2.0 10,203 3.3
Panama 1.712 3.6 2.044 3.0 1,342 2.4 16,244 5.2
Cayman Is. 2,609 5.5 1.658 2.5 588 1.0 7,332 2.4
Bahamas 737 1.6 620 0.9 121 0.2 3,459 1.1
Subtotal 5,058 10.8 4,322 6.4 2,051 3.6 27.035 8.7
Other LaL Am. 652 1.4 396 0.6 474 0.8 3.245 1.0
Total Lat. Am. 6.428 13.7 5.238 7.8 3,628 6.4 40,483 13.0
U.S. 21.701 46.2 32,540 48.2 26.128 45.9 130,529 42.0
Europe 9,116 19.4 14.808 21.9 14,290 25.1 59.265 19.0
Asia 5,569 11.8 8.238 12.2 7,054 12.4 47,519 15.3
Other 4,208 8.9 6.716 9.9 5.811 10.2 33,012 10.7
World 47,022 100.0 67.540 100.0 56,911 100.0 310,808 100.0
Source: A Blake Friscia, "Japanese Economic Relations




Regional Commitments by Export - Import Bank (as of 3/92)
Region Amount (mill U.S. $) Percent share
Latin America-Caribbean 5,292 29
Asia 6,706 37
Europe, Africa, Middle East 3,114 17
IMF -structural lending 3,04 17
total 18,152 100
Source: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Export - Import Bank of
Japan 1992
D. NEW GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
President Bush took office in 1989 giving Japan new hope
for harmony in policies toward Latin America. Since the Cold
War is over the U.S. policy toward Latin America has not been
as security oriented and there has been a stronger focus on
promoting economic growth in the Latin American region. These
changes include an adoption of freer trade and investment
policies toward the region. There has also been U.S.-
Japanese cooperation to support democratic governments and
economic reforms. Japan fully supported President Bush's
radical shift from world-wide aid to a policy of trade and
investment. This approach is more in concert with the
Japanese attitude that self-help efforts can be better
motivated by repayment obligations.
However, Japan has not been without its own money
problems. Japanese banks had a serious crisis in 1990 with
15
major cashflow problems and investment justification problems
with the government. 13 This caused tighter regulations for
foreign investment approved by the government of Japan.
By 1980 Japan had significant imports from Brazil, Mexico
and Chile; industrial operations in Brazil and Mexico; and
technical assistance contracted in Brazil, Peru and Paraguay;
but by 1990 the declining shares of import/export business
with the region was dramatic. Total shares of Japanese
exports to Latin America had dropped from 6.9% in 1981 to 4.1%
by 1991. Although the Japanese share of imports from Latin
America (with a focus on raw materials, fuel and food) had
increased by 47.5% in dollars, the share percent actually
dropped from 4.7% in 1981 to 4.2% by 1991. 14
The evolution of Japanese trade with Latin America from
1981-1991 is shown in Table 2-4.
Japan's concentration had shifted to southeast Asia
nurturing their high tech industry with less risky return on
investments. Even so, Japan's importance as an export market
is significant to several Latin American countries by percent
of total exports with Chile at 21%, Peru at 12%, Honduras at
11% and Brazil at 10% (Table 2 -5a) . Conversely, on the
percent of total imports the importance of Japan ranges from
13
"Japanese Banks: From Bad to Worse," The Economist . 7
November 1992
14 Friscia, p. 11.
16
TABLE 2-4
Total Exports LA. Total Imports LA. LA.
Exports to La. Share % Imports from LA. Share % Baiancs
1981 152.030 10.516 63 143290 6.669 4.7 3.357
1982 138.331 9.086 6J 131.931 6268 4.3 1318
1983 146.927 6J91 4J 126J93 6.462 5.1 -71
1984 170.1 14 3J49 5.0 136-503 7230 5J 1219
1985 175.638 3.486 4.3 129-539 6242 4.3 2244
1986 209.151 9.494 4J 126.408 6.194 4.9 3200
1987 229.221 3.760 3.3 149J 15 6255 4J 2.405
1988 269.917 9.297 3.4 137J54 8213 4.4 984
1989 274.175 9_381 3.4 210.347 8.370 42 511
1990 286.948 10.279 3.6 234.797 9.351 X2 423
1991 314J25 12,793 4.1 236.737 9.338 42 2^55
% Change 106.9 21.6 65-2 47J
1981-1991
Source: A. Blake Friscia, "Japanese Economic Relations
with Latin America, " Japan and Latin America in the New
Global Order, 1992
the 3ahamas at 15% to Venezuela and Costa Rica both at
approximately 3.3% (Table 2-5b). 15
In the new Japanese flexing of political muscle associated
with financial aid to foreign countries, new conditions now
applied to potential aid recipients in Latin America. Some of
the regulations for aid are less than congenial to U.S.
policy:
1. no aid for political reasons;
2. review of percentage of aid used for military purposes;
3. restrictions on the amount of weapons sold;
4. no aid if in possession of weapons of mass destruction;
s Friscia, o. 15.
17
TABLE 2 -5a
Relative Importance ofjapanese Exports to Latin American
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Dominican Republic 104 4.9
Venezuela 529 3.7
Costa Rica 78 3.3
Source: A. Blake Friscia, "Japanese Sconcmic Relations
wich Lacin America" Japan and Lacin America in che New
World Order, 1992
13
5. and recipient must be actively pursuing human rights,
democratization and a free economy.
Japan had also become politically involved in Central America
by sending observers for elections to El Salvador, Nicaragua
and Haiti not to mention the democratization requirement to
receive aid.
From the Latin American point of view this is a real
catch-22 in that the procyclical behavior of direct foreign
investment implies that a rise in direct foreign investment
has to be preceded by the reestablishment of an overall
economic and political climate conducive to growth, which in
turn requires a solution to the debt problem. 16
Regardless of all the setbacks, by 1991 the long awaited
economic revival of Latin America began with moves toward
democratic governments and economic policies designed to slash
inflation. 17 The big five debtor nations of Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina, Venezuela and Chile have had successful bond sales.
Additionally, Mexico, Venezuela and Chile have rising value of
debt on the secondary markets. 18 Most Latin American debt
16Eva Paus, "Direct Foreign Investment and Economic
Development in Latin America: Perspectives for the Future, " Journal
of Latin American Studies , v. 22, May 1989, p. 231.
17
"Virtue Rewarded," The Economist , 31 October 1992.
18
"There is a Better Way, and They Have Found It," The
Economist
. 19 October 1991, p. 21.
19
is being sold to rich Latin Americans who use it as a way to
repatriate flight capital or to recycle drug money. 19
The future prospects are interesting since the Japanese
have a new found mission to support development in the third
world. An increased Japanese presence is evident with foreign
investments to Mexico, Brazil (conditional) , Chile and
Venezuela. Japan will continue its reverse export programs,
assembly industries and searches for access to American
markets. The region should expect to see continued support
for economic reform and democratization.
E. SUMMARY OF JAPAN'S ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA'S
DEVELOPMENTAL PHASES:
The influence of Japan on Latin American economics becomes
significant as it progresses through the developmental phases
presented in this chapter.
In the first phase (1952-1976) Japan rose above the ashes
like a Phoenix, emerging as an economic entity establishing
global "mini" market enclaves. While Japanese participation
in the region grew under the watchful eye of Washington,
Japan's loan programs and import substitution industries were
instrumental in Latin America's economic growth.
In phase two (1976-1988) Japan awakened to the economic
and political dynamics in Latin America taking a strong stance
19
"Finance: Falling in Love Again," The Economist . 22 August
1992.
20
against U.S. policy. The Japanese government established its
own plan to assist in debt resolution as well as supporting
the plan presented in agreement with the U.S. and the
International Monetary Fund. Japan emerged as an independent
decision maker and ruthless financial manager.
In phase three (1989 -Present) there has been a partnership
between the United States and the Japanese cooperation to
support democratic governments and economic reforms. Also
there will continue to be a strong focus on economic growth in
the region with a strong Japanese presence with which the
United States will have to come to terms.
These three phases of economic developmental growth and
the significance of Japanese influence in Latin America set
the stage for further discussions concerning specific economic
relationships in the region. The next chapter will address




In one form or another Free Trade Areas (FTA) have been in
existence since World War II. In this chapter the foundations
of building FTA's, also known as Economic Blocs, are explored
with a focus on the implications for the Latin American
region.
A. HOW ECONOMIC BLOCS ARE BUILT
The formal General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
negotiations began in Geneva in 1947. These and subsequent
discussions have focused primarily on tariff reduction issues.
Each round of talks took longer to reach any agreements and
member nations became disenchanted with the lack of
conclusion. By 1963, concerns over growing protectionism were
added to the agenda. The Tokyo Round, held in the mid- 1970'
s
also addressed the continuing protectionist trends but failed
to resolve any safeguards agreement. 20 The Uruguay Round,
started in 1986, remained deadlocked in October 1992. 21
Although the GATT issues have finally been resolved at the
December, 1993 meeting in Geneva, the past stalemate of
20Enzo Grilli, "Macro- Economic Determinants of Trade
Protection," World Economy , September 1988, p. 322
21Sylvia Ostry, "The Uruguay Round:
Finance and Development . June 1991, p. 16
!1 An Unfinished Symphony,
"
22
discussion and perceived lack of direction had encouraged
countries to continue and even enhance their regional economic
affiliations.
Regional economic affiliations can lead to the formation
of free trade areas (FTA) or sometimes referred to as Economic
Trading Blocs. FTA' s eliminate barriers to trade at the
border between partner countries by means of a formal treaty
while preserving the right to independent action in external
relations. The FTA creates a preferential access to each
others markets, thusly creating an economic "bloc."
The European Community (EC) is undeniably the oldest free
trade area in existence today. The EC foundation was in the
Marshall Plan that aided in the reconstruction of Europe after
World War II. 22 This support encouraged Europeans to relax
trade restrictions and by 1950 formal trade specific
cooperative talks were held. By 1970, member states had
removed tariffs and created the infrastructure inherent to a
free trade area as we know it today. The EC structure speaks
for itself in its effectiveness. European Community trade
grew twice as fast as the rest of the international
economy. 23 The further steps taken by the EC, under
initiatives from Germany in the late 1980' s, have been
22Herbert E. Weiner, "America's Role in the Founding of the
European Community, " The Growth of Regional Trading Blocs in the
Global Economy
. (National Planning Association, 1990)
,
p. 57.
23John Pinder, The European Community: The Building of a




construed by some as the development of a hostile economic
regional trading bloc with a goal of complete economic
integration.
The United States and Canada have had a free trade
agreement that began with the Reciprocity Treaty of 1874. 24A
relatively close relationship has continued since, highlighted
by free trade agreements in agricultural equipment in 1944 and
automotive products in 1965. 25 The integration over the
years has evolved into an increasing level of comfortable
interdependency. In 1992, 74% of Canada's total trade was the
U.S.; 78% of Canada's 1992 exports were to the U.S. and 71% of
its imports were from the U.S. 26 To include Mexico in a North
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) would result in a market that
would rival that of the EC with a combined 1990 gross domestic
product (GDP) for North America at $5.9 trillion compared to
$4.4 trillion for the EC. 27
The intention of NAFTA negotiations has been to make the
agreement profitable to all three countries. The liberalized
24Maureen A. Farrow and Robert C. York, "Regional Trade and
Trends: A North American View from the Inside Out," The Growth of
Regional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy . (The National
Planning Association, 1990), p. 83.
25Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, North American
Free Trade : Issues and Recommendations , (Washington, D.C.
Institute for International Economics, 1992), p. 3.
26
"How To Make It in The World Market," Trade and Culture ,
v. 1, n. 3, Fall 1993, p. 95.
27World Development Report 1991 (World Bank 1991)
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trade relationships will eliminate customs duties on "tens of
thousands of items" over a 15 year period. 28 In addition
to this continental free- trade zone there is the potential of
eventually including the rest of Latin America in an "Americas
Free Trade Area." Because of the growing economic
interdependency and geographical contiguity, the Americas
trading relationships would result in growing regional
linkages. A regional "Americas" trading area is the most
likely result as expressed by President Clinton.
The Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA) is being nurtured by the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) , which was
created in 1967. The ASEAN was intended to accelerate
economic growth, social progress and cultural development in
the region. 2S Under Japan's impetus since 1987, the dormant
association has come to life. During the January 1992
Singapore summit, the commitment to ASEAN economic cooperation
gained momentum. Arguably, this summit may have been in
response to European and North American free trade area
initiatives. At this meeting, member nations decided to
28Keith Bradsher, "Headway on North American Trade Talks,"
The New York Times . 3 August 1992, p. CI.
29Lawrence B. Krause, "The Bangkok Declaration of ASEAN,
"
US Economic Policy Toward the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations
. (The Brookings Institute, 1982), p. 6.
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accelerate joint efforts in enhancing intra- ASEAN cooperation
and establishing an ASEAN free trade area. 30
Another factor promoting Asian economic regionalism has
been the U. S. negotiation of free trade areas in the
Americas, because it signaled the failure of America to
provide support for global free trade under GATT. 31
Regardless of the recent resolution of GATT differences,
regionalism is a formidable economic issue.
When the Asian free trade area is completed it would have
a combined GDP to rival that of the EC or NAFTA (Table 3-1)
giving it a greater voice in international trading
relations. 32 This ability to act in a unified manner on
international trade issues may be a determinant in the success
of the free trade areas.
B. ETHNIC INFLUENCE
Latin America became Japan's principal post-war emigration
outlet. Large numbers of immigrants from Japan relocated to
Latin America with over 100,000 settling in Brazil; 80,000 in
Peru; 30,000 in Argentina; 10,000 in Bolivia; and smaller
30
"The Singapore Declaration of 1992," ASEAN Economic
Bulletin , v. 8, n. 3, p. 376.
31Stephen W. Bosworth, "The United States and Asia,
"
Foreign Affairs . Spring 1992, p. 122.
32Augusto de las Torre and Margaret R. Kelly, Regional
Trade Agreements
. International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper
93, March 1992, p. 4.
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Source: International Monetary Fund (1992
numbers in Paraguay and Uruguay. 33 The government of Japan
understood the economic importance of these ethnic Japanese
enclaves, as well as the limitations of their island nation.
The economic importance of establishing an import source for
raw materials and food was paramount. Japan looked toward
Latin America, using the Japanese communities in these various
countries to aid in market establishment and to facilitate the
trading relationships.
Trade relations between Japan and Latin America, virtually
non-existent in the 1950' s, increased from $600,000 in 1960 to
15 billion by early 1980' s. 34 Japanese communities assisted
in establishing trading relationships between their new
countries and the motherland. Internal markets were made
available, as well as minerals and other raw material
resources. Japan must import virtually all its raw materials
and food supplies; whereas, the Latin American countries




However, more recently the second and third generations of
these original Japanese immigrants resent being used by Japan
since they now consider themselves as Brazilian, Peruvian,
etc. first and of Japanese heritage second.
The relative importance of these Japanese ethnic enclaves
on trade can be determined from Table 3-2. 35
TABLE 3-2
LEADING LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN JAPAN'S TRADE WITH THE REGION
1991
Imports from % share Exports to % share
Jaoan of reaion Japan of reaion
Mexico 22.0 Brazil 32.3
Brazil 9.6 Chile 19.2
Chile 4.9 Mexico 17.7
Argentina 3.5 Argentina 6.1
Paraguay 1.1 Peru 4.0
Source: A. Blake Friscia "Japanese Economic Relations with Latin
America, " Japan and Latin America in the New Global Order, 1992
The case of ethnic dependency as a factor in Japan's
trading policies or economic strategy can not be justified by
the weight of the various total exports to and imports from,
the region. The share of trade between Brazil and Japan is
predicated on the sheer size of Brazil and its perceived
unlimited raw materials needed by Japan. The table indicates
Mexico and Chile as significant trade partners but neither has
had the advantage of any Japanese ethnic communities to work
as a catalyst. Admittedly it is difficult to extrapolate the
35Friscia, p. 16
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impact of ethnic dependency without specific data on known
market cases. However, presented here in the simplest form
the available data does suggest the invalidity of hypothesis
#1: that Japan's interest in Latin America is generated by the
post World War II Japanese immigration to the region.
C. DOLLARS AND SENSE
The early allure of Latin America for Japan was the
unlimited raw materials and resources of the region. As early
as the 1950' s, heavy investments were put into mining,
agriculture and oil exploration in Mexico. The oil shocks of
the 1980 's and the exclusion from the Alaskan oil source
forced Japan to become the second largest oil customer of
Mexico's PEMEX (oil). 36 Japanese firms were willing to
invest in joint ventures with the Mexican government as a
minority partner, as in the case of NKS (steel) and PMT (oil
related equipment). 37
Although relations were strained at times over debt,
mismanagement and corruption in industry, Mexico held the
trump card in its vast oil reserves. To secure the oil
source, in 1980 the Japanese entered into a long term
36Luis Rubio, "Japan in Mexico: A Changing Pattern,"
Japan and Latin America in the New Global Order , (Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 71.
37Rubio, p. 72.
29
agreement for 100,000 barrels of PEMEX oil per day for a ten
year renewable contract. 38
In the last decade the Japanese have continued to take
advantage of cheap labor in Mexico and have expanded
investments from the maquiladoras plants where activities have
tripled from 1987 to 1989. Under the "maquiladora" program,
U.S. or foreign firms that are located in the United States
can ship U.S. made components to Mexico, assemble them in
Mexico at the maquiladora plants, and then have them shipped
back to the United States under favorable tariff conditions.
Since the maquiladoras are in reality export processing zones,
they do little to enhance the competitiveness or economic
growth for Mexico other than basic salaries and minimal
infrastructure. Virtually all Japanese exports from Mexico
are directed at United States markets and only 14% of profits
stay in Mexico. 39
Brazil's natural resources also attracted Japanese trading
companies in the early 1950' s. Products from lumber, mining
and agriculture were the initial investments. However, by
19 80 major investments had been made in thermal power plants;
38Miguel S. Wionczek and Miyohei Shinohara, "Las
Relaciones Economicas entre Mexico y Japon: Influencia del






petroleum exploration; port modernization and ship building;
agricultural projects; and lumber mills. 40
In foreign trade, conflict between the United States and
Japan has generated a degree of cooperation between Japan and
Brazil. When President Nixon announced the soybean embargo in
1973, Brazil and Japan entered into an agricultural joint
venture to solve the supply problem. The results were that
soybeans have displaced coffee as Brazil's leading cash
crop. 41 Under Japanese influence, by 1984, Brazil had the
entire Asian soybean market.
The promotion of cheaper beans from Brazil reduced the
cost of Japan's agricultural imports. Enter the consummate
trader- the more beans on the market, the lower the cost.
This is a simple supply and demand pricing issue in Japan's
favor. Other products Japan depends on Brazil to supply
include: coffee beans, iron ore, tobacco, beef, cocoa butter,
sugar, orange juice, fuel oil, steel products and organic
chemical products. 42
Although Brazil and Japan continue to have problems due to
the debt crisis resolution, cultural differences and
40Riordan Roett, "Brazil and Japan: Potential versus
Reality, " Japan and Latin America in the New Global Order ,
(Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 48.
41Leon Hollerman, Japan's Economic Strategy for Brazil ,
(Lexington Books, 1988), p. 226.
42CACEX, (Foreign Trade Dept, Central Bank of Brazil,
1988) .
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nationalism, there still remains an economic dependency.
Japan desperately needs to import the raw materials and food
resources while Brazil needs to export them to try to salvage
its economy.
Japan's economic strategy in the region has been
impressive. Japan has an "unlimited" supply of natural
resources, raw materials and food at the lowest possible
import price. These strategies have helped Japan become the
economic dynamo that it is today. Basic economic theory,
perfected by the Japanese, supports that imports at the lowest
cost with exports at the highest cost, yields a substantial
trade surplus. 43
D. PROSPECTS WITH THE PACIFIC
Although the basic demands of economics are most certainly
a driving force for Japan's activities in the Latin American
region, the drive toward a Pacific Rim trading area is
prevalent as well. With the emergence of the economic "Triad"
i.e. the free trade areas of the EC, NAFTA and ASEAN, there is
a real concern of trading bloc "lock-out."
Japan has used its economic influence in Mexico to gain
access to American markets under various guises. Currently,
the maquiladora assembly industries represent 34% of Japanese
firms in Mexico, with Nissan being the largest with 55% of all
43 Franklin R. Root, International Trade and Investment ,
South-Western Publishing, 1990)
32
Japanese investments in Mexico. 44 Mexico's appeal to Japan
has been the potential NAFTA market source. Japanese firms
are currently expanding maquiladora facilities to take
advantage of the new trade policies. In other words, Japan is
trying to get its foot in the door of NAFTA.
Another approach is that Japan wants Mexico to propose to
the United States a joint Mexican- Asian Pacific maquiladora
arrangement. 45 Additionally, Japan is trying every avenue
possible to entice Mexico into an trans-Pacific trade
agreement. This includes Japan's lobbying of the East Asian
Economic Council (EAEC) from excluding Pacific Basin
countries. This is all being done as a preventive measure
from a North American trading bloc exclusion of Asian
countries. 46 Countries other than Mexico that front the
Pacific have also been targeted for Japanese economic
maneuvers to gain access to Latin American and United States
markets
.
Since 1991 Japan has become Chile's largest export market.
The natural resources of minerals, lumber, fish and
agriculture are necessary for Japan's economy. Japan has
44 Friscia, p. 25.
45Riordan Roett, Mexico's External Relations in the
1990'
s
, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 151.
46Purcell p. 142.
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invested over $700 million in Chile in the last two years. 47
Additionally, the number of Japanese -owned companies in Chile
has doubled in the past two years.
Most economist are wondering how Chile penetrated the
Japanese market. More importantly, Chile has provided an
important foothold for Japan in Latin America. Terusuke
Terada, foreign minister in charge of Latin American affairs,
said in an interview in Chile's leading newspaper, El
Mercurio . "...Chile has to be pushed closer to the Pacific
Basin. . . .
"
48
Chile wants to be the "bridge" of choice for the Pacific
Basin countries into Latin America. Also, Japan hopes to use
Chile along with Mexico, to circumvent tariff barriers in the




President Fujimori has encouraged the Japanese investors
to Peru and is actively negotiating Japanese investments in
Peru's radical privatization program. 50 Given Peru's
reputation as a high risk nation, properties are considered to
47Nathaniel C. Nash, "Chile: Japan's Backdoor to the
West," The New York Times . 15 April 1993, p. CI.
48Nash, p. C6.
49 Ibid.
50James Brooke, "Privatization to Reshape Peru Market,"
The New York Times
. 4 April 1993, p. CI.
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be among the cheapest in the world and a good buy for the
Japanese
.
These economic ties and trading practices being
aggressively pursued along the Pacific Latin American
countries could be perceived as an attempt to outflank an
Americas trading bloc "lock-out." Therefore, it is important
to understand the dynamics of the world economic actors.
In the next chapter these dynamics are presented with an
emphasis on the U.S.- Japanese relationship and the
implications for Latin America.
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IV. ECONOMIC ACTORS
This chapter will discuss the unique roles of the United
States and Japan in the international trade system. The move
toward more American nations becoming trade partners within
the region and Japan's perceived victimization of economic
bloc "lock-out" are issues addressed. Additionally the
controversial Japanese trade practices in Southeast Asia are
examined with a look at the paradigm's application in Latin
America.
A. THE MAIN PLAYERS
Over the past several years, the international trade
system has been challenged. Currently, the world trade system
is characterized by regional interests. This is a result of
the separate but interrelated decisions of the main players
who together shape the international economy- the governments
of the "Triad" of the United States, Japan and the European
Community. 51
As early as 1984, the Japanese were opposed to the United
States shift in trade policy that could lead to the formation
of trading blocs. The Japanese claimed that "negotiating with
only like-minded countries would leave aside trade with
51Sylvia Ostry, "The Implications of Developing Trends in
Trade Policy," Business Economics , January 1990, pp. 23-27.
36
developing countries." 52 However, one could argue that bloc
countries already do a disproportionate amount of their trade
with one another anyway.
At the Federal Reserve's summer conference in 1991, the
bankers saw 5 reasons to support trading blocs: 53
1. The GATT had outlived its usefulness;
2. Trading blocs reduce national tariffs and trade
barriers;
3. Statistics show that blocs generate substantial
increases in trade among partners;
4. GATT- style free- trade, tariff -reduction solutions had
failed to deal effectively with non-tariff barriers; and
5. Trading blocs can be an effective way to compete with
Japan
.
The United States has fostered the regional free trade
idea since the 1961 inception of the Alliance for Progress (an
economic plan intended to promote trade among the countries of
North, Central and South America) . Although the Alliance was
considered a political failure, intra- regional trade did
increase and the foundations were set for the continuation of
that pattern. 54
With the mechanism for NAFTA in place, the United States
has been and continues to pursue trade agreements with other
52
"World Trade: A Risky Shift in Trade Policy," Business Week ,
12 November 1984, p. 34.
53Joseph L. Brand, "The New World Order: Regional Trading
Blocs," Vital Speeches . 15 December 1991, p. 155.




countries in the Latin American region. Such proposals are
part of the initiative for the Americas to promote intra-
Americas trade. The Enterprise for the Americas was comprised
of planned new partnerships for trade, investment and growth
proposed to create economic links between countries in North
and South America.
President Bush announced the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative in summer 1990. In the first year agreements were
signed with 16 Latin American countries. By June 1991, NAFTA
representatives had met with the MERCOSUR countries of Brazil,
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay and discussed an agreement
aimed to change and enhance trade relations between the two
groups , 55
By July 1991, a consortium of 13 Caribbean nations signed
trade agreements . The agreement with the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) included Antigua; the Bahamas; Barbados; Belize;
Dominica; Grenada; Guyana; Jamaica; Montserrat; St. Kitt and
Nevis; St. Lucia; St. Vincent and the Grenadines; and Trinidad
and Tobago. Remarkably, the United States has signed trade
agreements with a total of 29 American nations with just Cuba,
Haiti and Dominican Republic outside the trade pact. 56
55
"EUA, parcevus do Mercosul , " South American Business
Information
. 14 June 1991.
56
"U.S. -Carib Free-trade Talks," News
. 5 August 1991, p. 29.
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Although the Japanese have complained that the move toward
a Western Hemisphere trading bloc is an attempt to lock them
out, the reality is that the Enterprise for the Americas is
the federal government's response to the EC's unification plan
to establish a 12 -country free trade zone. 57 The results of
the union are likely to be increased intra -European trade and
diminished demand for U.S. products. However this may change
with the recent GATT agreement resolution.
Noted economist, Jagdish Bhagwati, recently wrote that the
Clinton administration indulges to excess the misperception of
U.S. declinism. 58 There is a view that America has disarmed
itself unilaterally in trade while others compete in "unfair"
trade practices. Could it be true that the main motivation
toward regionalism is protectionist: Mexico and Latin America
become the United States preferential markets, with Japan and
the EC at a disadvantage? Is that not what the EC unification
intended as well? Where does this leave Japan and Southeast
Asia?
Currently, Japan, projected as the economic dynamo of the
1980 's is in financial trouble in the 1990' s. The bubble
burst early in 1990 when the stock market lost half its value
57Brenda A. Jacobs, "Enterprising Initiatives Abound, " Bobbin ,
v. 32, n. 2, October 1990, pp. 14-18.
58Jagdish Bhagwati, "The Diminished Giant Syndrome: How




in just a few months. The 1992 collapse of inflated asset
prices and the failure of businesses with debt of 5.2 trillion
yen only added to the banking problems. 59 The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) forecast an unusually slow growth for
Japan at a mere 1.3% for 1993, the same as last year, compared
to 3.2% growth for the United States. 60 Add to these problems
the complaints in Japan of weak leadership and you have the
symptoms of economic fracture.
According to economist Peter Drucker, "Japan, INC." is in
disarray. The four basic pillars of Japanese policy have
collapsed or are tottering. The assumptions are: 61
1. Due to the cold war the U.S. would subordinate economic
interests to the maintenance of Tokyo's political
stability.
2. Dominate world markets by projecting Western trends, but
do it better and faster.
3. Japan's domestic economy was immune to outside troubles
(based on imports of raw materials and exports of
manufactured goods- this equation still works)
.
4. There is stability in commitment to long term policies.
Already Japanese companies have shifted from the
traditional strategy of outguessing and pirating from Western
competitors to genuine research for innovative ideas. The
main premise of Japan's foreign policy is that the country's
59
"Japanese Banks: From Bad to Worse," p. 99.
60Steven Greenhouse, "IMF Warns of Sluggish '93 Growth,"
The New York Times . 27 April 1993.
61Peter F. Drucker, "The End of Japan, INC?: An Economic
Monolith Fractures," Foreign Affairs . Spring 1993, pp. 10-13.
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security depends on its economic strength. One of the
problems in Japan is the lack of consensus on a new economic
policy. Japan fears that the emergence of regional trading
blocs could lead to a shrinkage of world trade which could
cause Japan significant economic hardship. 62
Despite all Japan's rhetoric about trading bloc
victimization, the Japanese continue to exploit Southeast Asia
by dominating the trade in the region. The Japanese have an
economic model in which Japan controls everything and they
have applied it toward Southeast Asia. They began with direct
foreign investments (DFI) into manufacturing which began a
cycle of dependency for the region. Japan's strategy includes
not just finished goods but parts and equipment upon which the
Asian exports depend. The regionalism is being promoted under
the auspices of ASEAN with the Japanese as the motivator.
However, the southeast Asian countries are now starting to
fight back.
The Japanese have begun to realize that their single-
minded pursuit of affluence and the use of their wealth in an
attempt to win friends and influence people in the outside
world is not always successful. In 1991, the Japanese Prime
Minister, Toshiki Kaifu, said that Japan was becoming
""Japanese Fearful of Regional Trading Blocs," Financial Times
(London) . 4 December 1991, p. 7.
41
politically, as well as, economically active in trading
regions . 63
This new geopolitical approach can be best exemplified in
South America. After Mr. Fujimori's seizure of near
dictatorial powers in April 1992, the international community
isolated the President of Peru; however, the Japanese
government continued to provide hundreds of millions of
dollars in vital foreign aid. In Chile, the Japanese made a
political move to push their favorite presidential candidate,
Eduardo Frei, and had even invited him to Japan on an official
visit just months prior to the election. 64
These moves toward security for investments, trade
agreements or even future economic policies in Japan's favor,
such as Latin American market access and blocking a regional
trade "lock-out", could be viewed as motivated by a bigger
geo- strategic necessity as presented in the second hypothesis.
B. THE UNDERSTUDIES
With the onset of the Latin American debt crisis in 1982,
the Japanese understandably looked elsewhere to make
investments and for economic development. The logical choice
was their own backyard- Southeast Asia.
63
"Japan: Affluence with Influence," Far Eastern Economic
Review , 20 June 1991, p. 41.
"Nash, p. C6.
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The understudies of Asia fall into two categories: 1) the
newly industrialized countries (NICs) of Hong Kong, Singapore,
South Korea, and Taiwan, sometimes referred to as Asia's
Dragons; and 2) the "new NICs" of Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Thailand, sometimes referred to as Asia's New
Little Dragons.
The Japanese paradigm of economic development utilized in
Southeast Asia describes a phenomenon in which a group of
economies, closely interacting with one another, advance
together as a whole, led by a predominant economy as the
growth center, followed by progressively less developed
economies in a hierarchical pattern. 65 The internal
sequencing is a matter of gradual development as evidenced by
the emergence of Asia's Dragons and new Little Dragons.
The Japanese have applied a little noticed policy to
promote greater integration of the region by using a mix of
Japanese government and private resources. In this way, Japan
feels that it can nudge the political leadership in the
direction it wants by virtue of the dint of its money. 66
However, in 1989, both the president of Singapore, Mr. Lee
Kuan Yew, and Dr. Mathathir Mohamad, prime minister of
Malaysia, made political statements about strong American
65Terutomo Ozawa, "The Dynamics of Pacific Rim
Industrialization, " Mexico's External Relations in the 1990'
s
,
(Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 131.
66Paul Maidment, "The Yen Block: A New Balance in Asia?," The
Economist
. 15 July 1989, p. 5.
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presence for regional security. Both men touched upon a
nagging distrust of a more assertive Japan. 67
Other Asian countries are also setting their priorities.
Many want the Japanese aid but not the strings attached. The
anger at Tokyo trade practices is growing in Asia where they
call Tokyo export policies predatory. For years the aid to
East Asia has been as goods and services from Japan. Since
the requirement is for Japanese manufacturing technology, a
dependency cycle was established. What really angers the
Asian manufacturers is that Japan will not sell its most
advanced technology (its not part of the paradigm). 68 The
Asians can only conclude that Japan is afraid that their
products would take over Japanese markets.
At the 1991, ASEAN conference, it was considered whether
East Asia should create its own East Asian Economic Grouping
as an economic consultive forum. Japan's economic dependence
is so great on the region that it would be compelled to
cooperate. 69 With the challenge to Japanese clout in
Southeast Asia, it is only a natural progression for Japan to
put more emphasis on activities in Latin America to insure its




James Sterngold, "Anger at Tokyo Grows in Asia, " The New
York Times , 13 April 1993, p. D2
.
69,, Trade: An Insurance Policy," Far Eastern Economic Review , 25
July 1991, pp. 52-56.
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and Peru as Pacific Rim countries has already been discussed
in regard to investments and financial manipulation. What is
of interest here is the Latin American governments'
determination to free their continent's trade, whether or not
worldwide trade is made freer (Figure 4-1).
The MERCOSUR group and the members of the Andean Pact have
taken measures toward internal free trade. The Central
American Common Market (CACM) with Panama have negotiated
trade with Mexico, Venezuela and Chile. 70 The Acting Finance
Minister of Chile, Jorge Rodriguez Grossi, made statements in
March, 1993, about the Free Trade Treaty with the United
States and resumed negotiations over free trade with
Colombia. 71 Chile continues its drive for free trade
integration agreements with Mexico and Argentina;
additionally, Chile has finalized a free trade agreement with
Venezuela. Chile has been very aggressive about continental
free trade, and in April, 1993, signed a trade agreement with
Bolivia. This is truly a significant step since there has
been no diplomatic relations between the two countries since
1962. 72 Chile has seriously reiterated its commitment to
further integration not only in Latin America but with the
70
"The Business of the American Hemisphere, " The Economist ,
2 4 August 1991, pp. 37-38.
71
"Acting Finance Minister on Free Trade Treaty, " Santiago HOY,
Santiago, 17 March 1993.
72Latin American Weekly Report . 29 April 1993, p. 183.
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FIGURE 4-1
Integration in the Americas and Shares of World Trade
Source: Convergence and Community: The Americas in 1993, A
Report of the Inter- American Dialogue
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United States, Canada and Pacific Rim countries as well. 73
Sometimes trade is negotiated to prevent being left out,
as recently reported: "CARICOM and Central American Economic
Integration Treaty (CIECA) seeking to develop a common
strategy to increase trade between the two sub- regions to
improve negotiating power when dealing with other economic
blocks." 74 This same phenomenon could explain part of Japan's
economic behavior in Latin America as suggested earlier in the
third hypothesis.
Mexico has led the way in the new emphasis on
international trade. In a paper given by Under- secretary
Minister of Foreign Affairs for Mexico, Andres Rozental, in
January, 1990, he clearly lays out the economic priorities for
Mexico: 75
1. Economic cooperation in the Pacific;
2. Not to limit international economic relations to a
single economic area alone;
3. Diversify Mexico's international economic policies;
4. Continue transition from highly protected economy to
most open model;
5. Diversification of economic exchange does not mean its
withdrawal from the U.S. market;
73
"Silva Cimma Remarks on Free Trade Agreements," Santiago
Radio Cooperativa Network, 17 March 1993.
74Latin American Regional Report: Caribbean and Central America
Report
. 1 April 1993, p. 1.
75Andres Rozental, "Mexico and the Pacific: A Great Economic
Challenge," given as a paper, Mexico City, January 1990.
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6. The idea is to strengthen presence in new markets, while
the objective is not to loose existing ones; and
7. Cooperation with the Pacific region is not to harm the
Latin American sub- regional integration efforts.
Mexico's economic reforms have caught the attention of
potential economic partners around the Pacific Basin. 76
Perhaps even investments for the new wealth of the Asian
Dragons
.
Although Mexico was praised by GATT in April, 1993 for its
trade practices being among the most open in the world, 7/ one
has to consider the significance of the May, 1993 investment
grade rated non-peso bond being issued in yen- denominated
notes. 78 It is apparent that Japan continues to use its
financial clout to influence internal financial and economic
decision-making and policy- setting in Mexico, as well as Chile
and Peru.
Mexico is Latin America's leading exporter and importer
with the United States as its largest market at 70% of Mexican
exports and supplying 65% of imports in 1990. Strategically,
an ideal application for the Japanese economic development
paradigm with Mexico as the leader for Latin America. Perhaps
76Lindajoy Fenley, "Promoting the Pacific Rim, " Business
Mexico . June 1991, p. 40.
77
"Mexico is Praised on Trade, " The New York Times .
21 April 1993.
78
"A Mexican Non-peso Bond is Rated Investment Grade, " The New
York Times . 19 May 1993.
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Mexico is being groomed as the "Latin Dragon" to bridge the
trade for the Pacific region.
There have been many issues presented and questions raised
concerning the economic activities of the "Triad" members: the
United States, Japan and the European Community. Each has at
one time or another opposed trading blocs while their own
regional activities were catalytic to the formation of such
blocs
.
The question remains whether these Free Trade Areas will
become true "blocs" or interact with each other to promote
world trade. Japan's activities in the Latin American region
have been primarily focused on the Pacific Rim countries.
This could be an indicator of bigger trade plans to
interrelate the FTA's of ASIA and the Americas.
The next section will explore the economic activities of
Japan in specific countries of Latin America. The country
studies include Mexico, Panama, Brazil and Chile.
49
V. COUNTRY STUDIES
A. PANAMA: EAST MEETS WEST
From the fledgling stages of Japanese shipping in the late
1950 's the Panama Canal has played an important role in
getting Japanese goods to European and other markets. When
President Carter renegotiated the Panama Canal Treaty it had
a significant impact on Japanese economic planning due to the
dependency on the canal to reach world markets . The
government of Japan now looked at the Latin American region
and saw its strategic importance.
With the onset of the debt problem the economic approach
to Latin America has been consciously and carefully pursued by
Japanese decision makers and economic planners. While
agreeing to assist with debt crisis resolution via the Brady
Plan, the Japanese also had their own initiative of the
Capital Recycling Plan. This plan was represented as a way to
recycle Japanese trade surplus money back to Latin America as
official assistance and loans.
By 1988 the investments in Panama rose nearly 800% on
paper. 79 Less than 20% of the established funds for Latin
79Friscia, p. 19.
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American assistance were granted to the region and over 50% of
the funds were funneled to Southeast Asia. 80
Investments from this fund granted to Panama were in the
shipping business. The Japanese data include the exports of
ships and boats to Panama, but actually are sent for shipping
registry purposes in that country. For example, in 1990 $3
billion in exports went to Panama for registration under flags
of convenience for Japanese shipping. 81 Remove these figures
from the Japanese export data and Japan would show a 1990
trade deficient instead of $428 million surplus as indicated
in Table 5-1.
Statistically, Panama is the largest importer of Japanese
goods at $3.3 billion in 1991 or 26% of the total. 82 However,
these are mainly Japanese exports of ships and boats for flags
of convenience and are not an indicator of domestic demands in
Panama. It is interesting to evaluate the difference in
foreign direct investment to Latin America calculated
excluding Panama versus including Panama for total
percentage : 83
The conclusion from Table 5-2 is that the U.S. remains







Japanese Trade with Latin America (million US$)
Total Export* L.A. Total Imports LA. L.A.
Exports to L.A. Share % Imports from L.A. Share % Balance
1981 152.030 10.516 6.9 143.290 6.669 4.7 3.857
1982 138.831 9.086 6.5 131.931 6.268 4.8 2.818
1983 146.927 6.391 4.3 126.393 6.462 5.1 -71
1984 170.114 8.549 5.0 136.503 7,230 5.3 1.319
1985 175.638 8.486 4.8 129.539 6.242 4 8 2.244
1986 209.151 9.494 4.5 126.408 6.194 4.9 3.300
1987 229,221 8.760 3.8 149.515 6.355 4.3 2.405
1988 269.917 9.297 3.4 187.354 8.313 4.4 984
1989 274.175 9.381 3.4 210.847 8.870 4.2 511
1990 286.948 10.279 36 234.797 9.851 4.2 428
1991 314.525 12.793 4.1 236.737 9.838 4.2 2.955
% Change 106.9 21.6 65.2 47.5
1981-1991
Japanese Trade with Oilier Areas in 1991
Exports % Share Imports % Share
United Slates 91.538 29.1 53.317 22.5
Southeast Asia 96.176 30.5 58.810 24.8
European Community 59.158 18.8 31.792 13.4
Middle East-Africa 15.888 5.1 31.203 13.1
China 8.593 2.7 14.215 6.0
Source: A. Blake Friscia, : Japanese Economic Relations in




FDI Latin America 1986-1988
excl . Panama incl . Panama
U.S. 19.4% 19.3%
Japan 07.4% 32.8%
Source: A. Blake Friscia, "Japanese Economic Relations
with Latin America" Japan and Latin America in the New
Global Order, 1992
crisis while Japan appears to manipulate the statistics by
misrepresenting Panama. The IMF stepped in to monitor the
investments to Panama as reported by the Japanese Capital
Recycling Plan and by the end of fiscal year 1991, Japanese
investments in Panama/Cayman dropped by 5 0% with more
investments going to Mexico and Brazil.
The Panama Canal Act of 1979 established the framework to
phase out United States functions at the Canal by December 31,
1999. M Therefore in 1982, the United States, Panama and
Japan (the second largest canal user) began to study long term
alternatives to the canal. 85 The concerns included the
maintenance of the infrastructure, appropriate financial
administration and alternate plans to handle the increasing
demands on the canal's capacity. Alternatives include
widening the canal and an alternate canal site. The General
Consular and Ships Directorates, Secnaves, has reported that
wAtkins, p. 3 34
85
"Comision Tripartita de Estudios para la Alternativa un
Nuevo Canal," Panama City Newspaper, 22 February 1993.
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the Pana~anian Merchant Marine fleet is the largest in the
world, as 56.3 million tons were registered under its flag,
representing revenues of approximately $100 million a year, as
of 1 November 1993. 86
A renewed interest in Panama has been with the recent
proposal for a new container complex on Telfus Island at the
Atlantic entrance to the canal. 87 An additional proposal is
to build a railroad parallel to the canal. 88 Both proposals
are presented as a multinational project with American,
Japanese and Panamanian investors. However, the Japanese have
done feasibility studies in Nicaragua for an alternate canal
location that would present economic hardship on Panama if
constructed.
Panama has made the effort to introduce cattle products to
the international market. According to Agricultural
Development Minister Cesar, Panama's cattle sector goals are
to export graded meat to sell on the Japanese market and to
improve milk production to produce only Grades A and B milk. 89
Provided the Panamanian government remains open to the
multinational investments and the IMF economic monitoring of
86E1 Panama America, Panama City, 3 December 1993.
87
"US -Japanese Consortium Proposes Container Complex in
Panama," La Prenza
. 15 May 1992.
88
"Sea-Land Backs Plan For Panama Boxport," La Prenza , 5
August 1992.
89
"Cattle Industry Improvinama, " Panama City Newspaper,
5 April 1993.
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those investments, future economic growth of Panama is
certainly promising.
B. MEXICO: LATIN DRAGON OR TROJAN HORSE
On August 13, 1982 the Mexican Finance Minister announced
that his country could not continue to service its debt. 90
The U.S. government with the International Monetary Fund put
together a short term rescue package. Other Latin American
governments followed Mexico's example citing many reasons for
the default. Although there were many internal and external
problems, one of the explanations was the end of the foreign
loans that these countries had become dependent upon. Timing
was bad. In the 1970 's the industrial developed countries
were hit with a recession consequently effecting loans to
third world countries. Add to this the oil shocks, increasing
oil pricing, a stagnated industrial base a huge unemployed
labor force and you have the formula for disaster. By the
time the Brady Plan was initiated twelve countries were
involved in the defaults.
The International Monetary Fund played an import role in
the rescheduling process for Mexico. The United States also




By 1985 the high cost of debt service and decreased
exports resulted in larger capital transfers to creditor
countries. This caused a further decline in investments and
consumption adding to the stagnation and inflation problems of
the country. Brady agreements were reached with Mexico,
Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. Furthermore, the U.S.
gave Mexico a 35% debt reduction as an act of good faith.
Mexico took the responsibility seriously and sought other
methods of debt reduction. Among the alternative plans
91were
:
1. debt -equity swaps; which did not work too well because
it didn't bring new money in and it caused inflated
assets
2. selling loans on the secondary market; which has picked
up in the last few years and now is one of three rising
value in the market
3. converting loans to bonds; which has been working very
well as a means to establish stability
The International Monetary Fund figures for 1991 show
Mexico with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 4.5%,
exceeded in Latin America only by Venezuela. That growth
statistic reinforces that Mexico was one of four Latin
American countries to be able to convert and reschedule debt,
and put it behind them.
91Stallings, p. 14
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The International Monetary Fund further states "if policy
reform continues, our assessment for growth in Mexico is quite
positive" . 92 93
Mexico is conditioning itself for a change in policies
from the protectionism borne of fear of U.S. domination. 94
Since the United States was the original provider of markets
and technology for Asia; Japan wonders why Mexico has failed
to use the benefits of being a U.S. neighbor. 95 Japan's
advice to Mexico is to take advantage of the strengths of the
U.S. and the latecomer advantage of technological borrowing.
Mexico is ambivalent as to which economic pole to connect
with. Despite frequent calls for cooperation in the Latin
American region the governments and economies have not been
mutually supportive. Japan is trying to woo Mexico into
joining the Southeast Asian development scheme. According to
Ozawa, the Asian paradigm points out the importance of
sequential restructuring of a latecomer economy from one phase
to the next by means of compatibility with the economy's
92Better Way, p. 21.
"Eugene Robinson, "Why Doesn't Latin America Work?,"
Washington Post Review . 6 January 1992, p. 11.
^Joseph Love, "The Origins of Dependency Analysis,"
Journal of Latin American Studies , v. 22, February 1990, p.
150.
95Terutomo Ozawa, "The Dynamics of Pacific Rim
Industrialization: How Mexico Can Join the Asian Flock of
Flying Geese, " Mexico's External Relations in the 1990'
s
,
(Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 129.
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prevailing factors and technological endowments as outlined in
Figure 5-3. 96
This Asian economic development pattern can be equated to
what I call the "big sister syndrome"; whereby, when one
daughter outgrows a garment it is passed on to the next in
line who in turn when outgrown will pass it on again, etc.
The Japanese see key aspects to this natural order of
industrial sequencing that are vital for Mexico to understand
in order to do business with Japan. 97 These key aspects
include knowing what phase of industrial restructuring each
rank represents, what ways each are developing new comparative
advantage, and what policies are need to make the group expand
and prosper. As illustrated in Figure 5-4, Japan's postwar
period of economic transformation has been systematic. Japan
has offered Mexico a similar plan of four sequential phases to
economic development:
1. export -oriented, labor intensive, light industry
2. export -oriented, heavy industrial and chemicals
3. export -oriented, assembly based
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The emphasis is on the importance of industrial linkage which
is the transfer of equipment, technology, etc. to the next
level i.e. a systematic industrial transplant. 98
Japan is offering Mexico a position in the ranks, so to
speak; however, it would be in a Phase 1 level behind the four
Asian junior tigers. This raises the issue of Japan's motive
given that Mexico is doing so well and is considered a Newly
Industrialized Country (NIC) versus the junior tigers who
until very recently were categorized as Late Developing
Countries (LDC) . Could it be that Japan is looking for some
place for the four juniors: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea
and Taiwan to invest? Could it be that Japan is looking for
more profits from the "maquiladora" to go back to Asia? Since
with this assembly industry type of investment there is an
expectation of recouping investment plus profit it is not a
surprise that repatriated investment income would far outstrip
reinvested income to the facility.
The driving force behind direct foreign investment (DFI)
is access to either raw materials or low cost inputs (i.e.
labor)
. Currently, the maquiladora assembly industries
represent 34% of Japanese firms in Mexico, with Nissan being
the largest with 55% of all Japanese investments in Mexico. 99




Latin America depends on whether and how the needs of Latin
American countries coincides with the needs of the
multinational corporation. 100 Mexico's appeal to Japan has
been the potential North America Free Trade Zone.
Japanese firms are currently expanding maquiladora
facilities to take advantage of the new trade policies. With
the industrial expansion there is an anticipated population
move to the economic development area. 101 This expansion of
industry and labor will require additional facilities to be
built further south resulting in an uneven economic growth
pattern in Mexico. Additionally, since the maquiladoras are
in reality export processing zones, they do little to enhance
the export ability and competitiveness of the host country. 102
Although Salinas openly supports the Japanese influence in
Mexico, Ocampo says that the level of influence harms national
sovereignty, a fact which would become a major source of
irritation to the people. 103
Along with the maquiladora facilities, the continued
interest in raw materials and oil, Japan is also looking at
100Paus, p. 222
101Gershon Alperovich, "Economic Development and
Population Concentration, " Journal of Economic Development , v.
41, October 1992, p. 64.
102Paus, p. 237.
103Jose Antonio Ocampo, "New Economic Thinking in Latin
America," Journal of Latin American Studies , v. 22, February
1990, p. 178.
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Mexico as a leader in a new trading scheme. Japan is looking
at nations fronting the Pacific Ocean to add a Trans -Pacific
dimension to trade. For example, President Salinas and the
governor of Guadalajara, Carlos Rivera, are currently-
negotiating with Japan on a 1000 acre industrial park joint
venture in Guadalajara. The site represents $70 million
future investments from Asia. 104 Japan has also been actively
lobbying the East Asian Economic Council (EAEC) from excluding
Pacific basin countries. This is being done as a preventative
measure from a North American trading bloc excluding the Asian
countries. 105
The government of Japan is enticing the government of
Mexico into undertaking the initiation of several innovative
measures to the United States. One is for the government of
Mexico to propose an economic cooperative program to be
administered jointly by the United States and Japan. The
second is Japan wants Mexico to initiate a proposal for a
Mexican-Asian Pacific maquiladora program in exchange for the
expanded use of the present Mexico-United States maquiladora
arrangement. 106 Japan claims this would neutralize U.S.
criticism of Mexico's maquiladora as a Trojan Horse to hide
exports from Asia. If the maquiladora continues to be used
104
" Construiran un Parque Industrial con Recursos




one-sidedly by the Asian economies, there is a danger that the
U. S
.
/Japanese relationship will become even more strained.
However, foreign investments in Mexico exceeded $1 billion
in April, 1993. 107If foreign investments and trade patterns
continue with a Pacific focus, then Mexico could develop into
a Latin Dragon.
C. BRAZIL: SEARCH FOR STABILITY
The original lure of Japan to Brazil was the internal
market and natural resource base. As a Japanese publication
put it:
The appeal of Brazil is different from that of other newly
developed countries, and lies in its extensive and fertile
landscape, its abundant underground resources, and its
diverse make-up of racial and ethnic groups. The source
of Brazil's vitality lies in its diversity and
creativity. 108
So it can be said that foreign investment appeal depends not
only on the economic conditions in Latin America but also by
the relative attractiveness of the region versus others as a
profitable investment.
As stated earlier in this paper there has been a large
Japanese -Brazilian population since World War II. Initially
these groups assisted with establishing markets during the
early stages of economic penetration. However, more recently
107
"Evolucion de la inversion extranjera en Mexico duran
Abril de 1993," Nacional Financiera, Mexico City, 1 July 1993.
108Roett, p. 101.
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these people resent being used by Japan since they now think
of themselves as Brazilians first.
The mid 1950' s saw an import substitution
industrialization encouraging Japanese investments.
Additional investments included the 1958 USIMINAS steel
venture and the 1959 ISHIBRAS shipbuilding venture. By 1961
Japan had $158 million invested in Brazil. 109
By the mid 1960's Brazil had opted for economic growth
rather than fiscal entrenchment and now became the perfect
candidate for the Japanese "loan pushing".
The 19 70' s saw a stagnation in the import substitution
industries as explained by Joseph Love, "the ISI had failed
because of lack of dynamism of the export sector, coupled with




Other problems included ceilings on domestic markets,
highly skewed income distribution and lack of skilled labor.
The skewed income distribution is also cited by the United
Nations Development Programme as a founding factor in Brazil's
socialization problems. 111 The "Brazilianization" added to the
economic woes. The government passed laws that required that
Japanese firms must use approximately 50% of domestically
109Roett, p. 105
110Love, p. 150.
Ill inWhy the Poor Don't Catch Up," The Economist , 25 April
1992.
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produced components in any manufacturing or assembly done in
Brazil. 112 Insisting on high local content is self defeating
since the resulting product can not compete on the world
market
.
With the change that occurred in the late 1970' s with
excelerated lending, the Japanese banks went around "official"
Japan and started lending money directly to Latin American
governments at their own risk. Additional investing included
paper pulp, ALUNORTE aluminum refining, and CERRADO
agricultural developing. 113
With the onset of the debt crisis the Japanese banks were
most vulnerable due to the non- government protected lending
practices. All private bank lending came to an immediate end
with the debt crisis of 1982. The outstanding debt continues
to be a source of irritation between Japan and Brazil. Brazil
is one of four countries not resolving the debt crisis (others
are Argentina, Peru and Ecuador)
.
Brazil rejecting restructuring and being in the arrears in
debt servicing called a moratorium on debt payments in 1987.
During the mid- late 1980' s official Japanese funds via the








- Paulinas thermal power plant
- Campos basin petroleum exploration
- Santos port modernization and shipbuilding
- Minas Gerais irrigation project
- Goias rural electrification project
In 1989 the government of Brazil called a second
moratorium on debt payments. Japan had been trying to sell
Brazilian debt on the secondary market; however, with the
announced moratorium transactions were cancelled. The
Japanese irritation level was now growing exponentially.
By 1990 the relations between Japan and Brazil were
fragile-- the Japanese cited the unwillingness to settle the
interest arrears, the pugnacious attitude toward foreign
investors and the snubbing of diplomatic protocol as a few of
the problem areas.
The Japanese had been "burned" by years of uncertainty in
Brazil. This includes the inconsistency of the governments
dealings with foreign investors ; whereas, the government
would offer subsidies to Japanese firms to establish
subsidiaries to produce goods necessary for the economy and
once the firms were established, the subsidies were cut. 115
With the failure of Brazil to sign a restructuring agreement
with the International Monetary Fund and the $8 billion in
115Hollerman, p. 133
67
interest arrears, Japan with the United States agreement in
1991 froze Brazil's access to any assistance funds.
The markets in Japan for Brazilian goods are decreasing
and trade between the two countries was not significant in
1988 with Brazil exports to Japan at 6.7% and imports from
Japan at 6.6% 116 The market continues to shrink as indicated
by Table 5-5. Although Japan still needs the natural
resources, there has been neither new investments nor
disinvestments. The IMF figures put Brazil at stagnant Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) growth for 1991 and 1992 stating that
"...due to poorer than expected performance by Brazil...." 117
IMF figures showed Brazil debt service as 55% of GDP with the
U.S. and Japan holding 76.1% of total loans to Brazil.
Brazil's most conspicuous problem is inflation; currently
running at about 3 0% a month. Brazilian wages paid monthly in
arrears have lost 30% of their value; a bill paid six months
late will have lost 90%. 1I8The inflation impoverishes the poor
and discourages investors.
I16Purcell, p. 107.
117Better Way, p. 21.
118





BRAZIL BILATERAL TRADE (million U.S. $)
Exports iu Japan
% change
1988 1989 1990 (1989-90)
Manufactures 604.1 561.5 4705 -16.2
Raw materials 1.831.9 1.925.1 2.237.1 + 16.2
Foodstuffs 499.9 504.3 439.9 -12.8
Fuels 5.7 1.5 2.0 +33.0
Others 8.7 6.9 23.7 +243.5






Manufactures 941.7 1.193.5 1.193.0 -0.0
Raw materials 6.1 5.8 4.7 -19.7
Foodstuffs 4 1 5.1 2.6 -486
Fuels 38.6 494 9.2 -81.3
Others 7.6 56.3 15.6 -72.3
Total 998.1 1.310.1 1.225.1 -6.5
Source: Riordan Roett, "Brazil and Japan: Potential Versus
Reality, " Japan and Latin America in the New Global Order ,
1992
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Japan has tolerated Brazilian economic behavior just
enough to ensure the raw material base Japan so desperately
requires. However, Chile is fast becoming the raw materials
supplier of choice.
D. CHILE: CLASSIC ECONOMICS
The Chilean economic recovery and growth consists of three
periods. The first falls roughly between 1972-1982 in which
policy makers failed to control the peoples tendencies to live
above and beyond their means. This led to the same problems
that the rest of Latin America was experiencing:
- creation of large national deficits
- skyrocketing foreign debt
- financial panic
The early trading patterns of the Latin American states
were overwhelmingly dominated by their powerful North American
neighbors and to some extend by the states of western Europe.
Unusually enough for Latin America, Chile did almost as much
trade with western Europe (England, France, Germany) as it did
with the United States. As indicated in Table 5-6, in 1960
3 7% of exports and 4 6% of import trade was with the United
States, while the Europeans took 3 8% and 24% respectively. By
1986 the United States was at 22% of Chilean exports and a
leading 22% of imports. The Europeans were still the leading
export market with 24% and took 17% of the import market.
70
Japan was only at 10% of trade in 1986. 119 At that time Chile
was not considered a Asian- Pacific trader and remained
strongly oriented to the American and European trade.
TABLE 5-6
Chilean Trade by Region
1960 1986
exports imports exports imports
37% 46% 22% 22%





Source: compiled from Financial Times 15 April 1988
The second period of economic recovery coincided with
1982-1988 and represented some economic failures as well as
successes. Chile was able to address the debt crisis problem,
reschedule debt with the Brady Plan and experience declining
unemployment thanks to higher copper prices. In 1985, total
external debt was $20.4 billion placing Chile as the fifth
largest debtor in the Latin American region after Brazil,
Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela. 120 Japan was only carrying
119Financial Times, 15 April 1988.
120Robert Devlin, Debt and Crisis in Latin America: The
Supply Side of the Story , (Department of Economics, Princeton
University, 1986), p. 45.
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9.5% of the countries debt representing $1.4 billion while the
US carried 47.3% of Chilean debt at $7 billion. 121
The third period falls roughly from 1988 to the present.
During this period monetary, fiscal, financial, labor, trade
and foreign exchange policies were well planned. By March
1992 Chile was the first country in Latin America to come out
of the debt restructuring phase. 122 The Chilean government
had no illusions of the economic recovery that has been
accredited by some to be a result of the copper price boom of
1987. By 1989 Chile had worked its external debt down to
$17.8 billion from a peak of $20.7 billion in 1986.
Additionally, the interest -export ratio was down from nearly
50% to under 25%; inflation kept under 20% and reduced
unemployment to under 7% 123
Much has been said of the economic recovery of Chile in
the past few years; whereby, Chile has now enjoyed five years
of solid economic growth. Currently the economy has all the
indications of a sustainable economy moving Chile into the
newly industrialized country (NIC) category along with Mexico.
Both Chile and Mexico can be more properly considered Pacific
121Friscia, p. 29
122Roger E. Shields, "Latin America: Growing
Opportunities," Business Credit . March 1992, pp. 8-9.
123John Williamson, Progress of Policy Reform in Latin
America
. (Institute for International Economics, 1990), p. 38.
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Latin American NICs as they become more active in the
international community.
Will the reform last? The first thing to note is that
Chile is probably the best managed economy in Latin America.
In 1993 Chile was ranked fifth most competitive (behind
Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Malaysia) of the NICs by
Switzerland's World Economic Forum. 124 Chileans boast that
theirs is the most open economy in the Americas with even less
tariff restrictions than the United States or Canada. The
basic model is classic textbook economics to open borders and
play on the strengths of the country.
Importantly, it is hard to sustain an initial growth spirt
based on copper prices; however, Chile's non- copper exports
have grown from nearly $3 billion in 1987 to $6.1 billion in
1992. 125
Since 1991 Japan has surpassed the United States as
Chile's major export market. US -Chile trade reached nearly $4
billion in 1992 but Chile exported $1.7 billion to Japan and
only $1.4 billion to the US. 126 Chile's major exports to
Japan are chemicals, minerals and forestry, fishing and
124|, Chile Shows the Way-Or Does It?", The Economist ,
13 November 1993, p. 8.
125Carlos Singer, "Chilean Companies Expand Throughout
Latin America," Trade and Culture . Fall 1993, p. 121.
126Elizabeth McCarthy, "Japan is Increasing its Economic
Interest in Chile," Business America . 5 April 1993, pp. 14-
15.
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agricultural products. Chilean imports from Japan are
primarily automobiles and electronics.
The statistics tell the story (Figure 5-7). Chile's
economic growth will have averaged 6% in four years, a
spectacular 10.4% in 1992 giving way to 5.5% for 1993.
Inflation running close to 30% in March 1990 was at 12% for
1993. Investments are running at 27% (equivalent with Asia)
of GDP for 1993. 127 Most Chileans agree with President
Eduardo Prei to stick with current free market policies which
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In April, 1993 Eduardo Frei, then only a presidential




'""Chile: Growth for All," The Economist . 27 November
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treatment. Shortly after the visit, Japanese companies made
commitments to invest $700 million in Chile to include
industrial and manufacturing joint ventures. 128 Upon winning
the election, the new president reiterated his commitment to
Chilean economic reform. He further stated a continued
interest to seek admission to NAFTA, but also stated that
Chile would join the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum in 1994. 129
However, Chile has taken the Japanese model and adapted it
to business principles to fit Chilean economic goals. Since
Chile's domestic market is small, many firms realized that
their long-term growth prospects were in foreign markets.
Seizing the business opportunities Chilean companies are
pursuing strategies similar to Japanese enterprises in
Asia. 130 These strategies include:
- direct exports
- establishing a permanent presence in the target market
such as Chilean managers
- establishing a bone fide company in the foreign market
- acquiring local companies
- establishing joint ventures with local companies
128Nathaniel C. Nash, "A New Rush into Latin America, " The
New York Times . 23 April 1993.
129




The financial wizardry continues to be impressive. The
International Finance Corporation (IFC) global emerging
markets indices show that from 1988 to 1992, the stock
exchange in Chile rose by more than 100%, compared with a 51%
increase in the United States and a 43% decline in Japan. 131
After examining the role of Japanese firms and the shadow
strategy of the Chileans, there appears a new trend first
applied in import substitution, but increasingly being applied
to the export sector. This new trend is called "new forms of
investment" (NFI) . NFIs include subcontracting, licensing,
component production and franchising. 132
Chile is untypical of Latin America in that Chile has
shown how to change one of the most closed economies into one
of the most open. It is doubtful that any reforms will be
reversed in the foreseeable future. The people have taken
ownership and private enterprise to heart and now have a
vested future. The fastest growing markets for Chile are
Latin America and Asia. The Chileans are doing so well on
their own that even though membership has been applied for in
APEC and interest remains in NAFTA, Finance Minister Alejandro
Foxley stated, "the most important aspect of joining a free
trade zone would be to strengthen our investment process,
131
"Outlook for the Stock Markets, " Latin American Weekly
Report
. 9 September 1993, p. 416.
132Mikio Kuwayama, "New Forms of Investment in Trade from
Latin America," Comercio Exterior . May 1993, pp. 448-497.
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which is already significant today." Foxley added, "...that
the signing of an agreement with North America would mean a
significant boost in investors with capital from Japan,
Europe, and South America, who would want to establish
themselves here and use our market as a platform for entering
the great North American market." 133
Although Chile continues to supply raw materials and
investment opportunities for Japan, it certainly is apparent
that the Chileans have learned their lessons well in applying
Japanese business strategies for the betterment of their own
economy. The use of Pacific Latin American NIC markets as an
entry to American markets is no longer a threat but an
eventuality to be recognized.
133EL MERCURIC Santiago, 19 November 1993
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A. PATTERNS AND RELATIONSHIPS
This study has shown the evolution of the significant
Japanese influence on Latin American economic growth. Japan
started out with a basic need for raw materials and evolved
into a major economic and financial player in the Latin
American region. The economic issues that were consistent
throughout included the importance of raw materials; the
maturation of the Japanese loan program; the diversification
and implication of direct foreign investments; the struggle
for independent policy decision making without causing strain
with the United States; and the nurturing of the fledgling
Pacific Latin American NICs
.
In the country case studies of Chapter V, four very
different economic relationships were analyzed with a look at
the host country- Japanese economic benefits.
In the Panama study it was readily apparent that the
economic relationship was asymmetrical with Japan's shipping
investments for foreign flag purposes. For economic purposes
Japan includes the shipping data in the total DFI for Latin
America which skews the results dramatically. It is clear
that the recent renewed interest in the future of the Panama
78
Canal to be of economic concern for Japan without political
undertones
.
A lengthier analysis of Mexico's economic relationship
with Japan seemed appropriate given that Mexico is the closest
neighbor to the United States in the region. Japanese
influence played a major role with raw materials development
and oil exploration. Japan played a significant role in early
economic development with loans and investments. Even with
the debt crisis the Mexican- Japanese relationship remained
solid. Today the economic and political relationship between
the two countries is on a fast track with Japan's pursuit of
Mexico to become the "Latin Tiger." The direct foreign
investments continue to grow with an emphasis on the
maquiladora arrangements with the United States. President
Salinas continues to be wooed by Japan into the Southeast Asia
development network and is not resisting. Economically the
relationship is still asymmetric; however, the political
relationship is getting stronger as President Salinas looks
for a balance against the United States. I see a "romancing"
of Mexico by Japan with regional integration as the impetus
and the Japanese paradigm as the method. At this time I do
not see either issue as a threat to the United States. Free
trade, economic growth and stability are still the United




Brazil presented a challenge in this analysis since the
Japanese influence has been varied over time and the
relationship between the two countries has experienced some
turbulence. Raw materials lured Japan to Brazil and Japan was
enchanted with the people and the beauty of the country.
Significant investments in raw materials and import
substitution industrialization assisted Brazil in the economic
boom. With continued loans and foreign investments throughout
Brazil's economic rollercoaster ride, Japan has tried to
ensure the security of obtaining vital raw materials.
However, as Brazil's defiance toward debt resolution and
the "Brazilianization" process increased, Japan found it
difficult to justify further investments. I think that Japan
will keep economically involved in Brazil just enough to
ensure the raw material base Japan so desperately requires.
Not only is Chile rapidly replacing Brazil as the country
of choice for raw materials but also for investment and joint
venture business opportunities. Chile is atypical for Latin
America in that the Chileans were able to open up the most
closed economy into the most open in the region. Using the
classic textbook economic approaches of free trade, the
Chilean economy has recovered to the extent that Chile is
considered the best investment in Latin America. Under a
closely managed economy Chile has secured a place as a Pacific
Latin American NIC providing viable business opportunities
for Japan and other Asian investors. Interestingly enough,
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Chileans have successfully adapted Japanese business models to
fit Chile's economic goals. Chile has the economic interest
and intent to engage both APEC and NAFTA for market resources.
In addition to the natural fit of Chile into NAFTA, I see
Chile becoming the "Bridge Across the Pacific" uniting markets
and resources for maximum trade benefits.
Japan has shown that it approaches Latin American
countries on a case-by- case basis. Each country is
approached with an astute economic policy nuanced by the
economic needs of Japan.
I. UNCOMMON MARKET: THE START OF SOMETHING BIG
Although a lofty prediction, it is most likely that by the
turn of the century, North America, Western Europe and East
Asia will be regional powerhouses of roughly equal economic
strength, each with an output of $6.8-8 trillion. 134
The question that continues to nag at economists is
whether or not the Free Trade Areas are a form of
discrimination and are they legal under GATT. Regionalism
offers opportunity for more trade within the region, though
there is possibility of some trade diversion. All this can be
compatible with GATT and is even legal under GATT
I34Melvyn Westlake, "Welcome to a Tri -polar World, " Bank ,
v. 141, n. 735, July 1991, pp. 22-25.
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regulations. 135 However, the greatest poison to :he
multilateral system today is neither European integration nor
the prospect of a North American Trade Bloc, but rather the
failure of the GATT process to open up Japan. 136 This
position is supported by Robert Z. Lawrence, a senior fellow
at Brookings, who states that a balance of economic power
exist now between the United States and Europe; however, Japan
despite its economic power, does not have this balance because
of its relatively closed markets. 137
The Pacific region will probably not become an economic
force under ASEAN because Japan and the other Asian countries
do not have any common affinity. In fact, most have been
occupied at some point by the Japanese and have no desire for
Japanese control or influence on their nations' development.
However, Asian leaders do see the Pacific coope :ion effort
as an essential strengthening of regional trade arrangements
as a step toward the globalization of free trade. 138
Looking at the situation from a global perspective, there
are two great transformations underway in world economics
135Norman S. Fieleke, "One Trading World or Many: The Issue of
Regional Trading Blocs, " New England Economic Review . May/June
1992, pp. 5-6.
136Rudiger Dornbusch, "Dornbusch on Trade, " The Economist , 4 May
1991, p. 67.
137
"Trading Blocs Coming: Brookings Experts See Good, Bad, "
Rubber and Plastic News . 2 7 May 1991, p. 7.
138Maurice F. Strong, "Adaptations of the Blocs," Financier ,
April 1989, pp. 15-23.
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today: 1) a transition from the American "mass production" to
the Japanese perfected "lean production" (lean means using
less of everything from raw materials to workers) ; and 2) the
shift from a global international economic system to a world
system composed of a few regional free trade areas. 139
The dramatic changes in Latin American economics in the
1990' s will be linked to the integration with the global
economy as a cornerstone for Latin America's reforms. Japan
will continue its economic development programs in targeted
Pacific Rim countries for raw materials and Western Hemisphere
market access; while Asia's Dragons and Little Dragons look
forward to Latin American investment opportunities.
I don't perceive a strong regional yen bloc developing.
As discussed in Chapter IV, Japan has problems in achieving
balance between economic aggression and political diplomacy.
Japan knows how to win the game; but, is short on
sportsmanship. The Southeast Asian countries will not permit
Japan to be the economic decision-maker for the region. The
East Asian Economic Grouping will probably develop into an
admirable format over Japanese economic dominance.
Although the center of global economic dynamism is
shifting, a Pan- Pacific arrangement which includes the United
States is most likely, probably in the APEC forum. Currently,
139James P. Womack, "Americas," Latin Finance . March 1991,
p. 45.
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the United States and Japan dominate the Pacific Rim
economically; however, China's economy is a growing force to
be reckoned with in the near future. The possibility of sub-
blocs within the Pan- Pacific scheme could include a yen bloc
of Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand; a Peking bloc of
China, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong; the Western
Pacific community of Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan,
Korea, and others; and the Eastern Pacific community of
Canada, the United States, Mexico, and perhaps Central and
South America. 140 As you can see the overlapping trade
patterns are virtually unlimited and to everyones advantage
for free trade.
Future economic growth on the Pacific Rim could be
effected by global economic trends, commodity prices,
political problems and resistance to open markets and free
trade. While creating new wealth and opportunities, free
trade destroys jobs in the least competitive sectors of the
economy and forces the overall system to become more
efficient. The development of more efficient economies
creates more jobs and increases the overall standard of
living.
140Kim Duk Choong, "The Pan- Pacific Card," Far Eastern Economic
Review
. 21 December 1989, pp. 60-61.
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II. NEW REALITIES REVISITED
The regional economic blocs as presented in Chapter III
are undoubtedly the way of the future. Japan's role in this
developmental process has been curious at best. Although
Japan claims victimization by the NAFTA, it continues with
predatory trade practices in Southeast Asia. It appears that
the rules change to the advantage of Japan.
From Japan's economic behavior (economic patterns and
relationships) it can be determined that two of my hypotheses
are supported. The first is that Japan's interest in Latin
America stems from basic economic needs. This is suggested by
the economic drive for raw materials and resources from the
Latin American region that is supported by the country
studies. One of the basic elements of economics is to move
capital from the location of surplus to the location of
deficit. Therefore, it can be said that Japanese basic
economic requirements were the impetus for Southeast Asia and
Latin American economic development.
The second is that Japan's interest in Latin America is
geostrategically motivated. This is supported by several
factors discussed in the economic analysis of Chapters III and
IV:
1. The main premise of Japan's foreign policy is the
dependence on economic strength. Japan has the intense
desire to have a global bargaining power. Japan uses
"monetary muscle" to influence politics such as in
Mexico, Chile and Peru.
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Japan has a fear of a Western Hemisphere trading bloc
"lock-out"; thereby, causing a shrinkage in world trade
which would significantly hurt Japan's economic
security. Japan is maneuvering to outflank this
perceived "lock-out" by solidifying substantial trade
positions and economic influence in targeted Latin
American countries. After all, it is enticing that the
Americas control 21.69% of world trade in merchandise.
3. Japan wants to be taken seriously. The only way Japan
knows how to get international recognition is to use
economic clout to achieve political ends. What the
Japanese exhibit as economic prowess is often dwarfed by
the lack of political finesse.
The implications of both the emergence of economic trading
blocs and the new found mission for Japan in Latin America,
are all positive from an economic point of view. The
emergence of a Pan- Pacific trade arrangement opens up free
trade in a multitude of directions with as many options. Free
trade can only help in the economic growth and development of
Latin America and contribute to a chain reaction of economic
stimuli around the Pacific Rim.
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